Verisoph story dossier
The neoconservative think tank (1997-2006) that urged regime change in Iraq, then saw its signatories staff the Bush administration that invaded. Its documents, the 'new Pearl Harbor' line, and the war it had pressed for years.
The neoconservative think tank (1997-2006) that urged regime change in Iraq, then saw its signatories staff the Bush administration that invaded. Its documents, the 'new Pearl Harbor' line, and the war it had pressed for years.
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A classified Pentagon draft, prepared under Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz with input from I. Lewis Libby and drafted by Zalmay Khalilzad, is leaked to the press. It argues the United States should prevent any rival superpower from rising and should be ready to act alone. The language was softened after the leak, but its ideas resurfaced in later neoconservative thinking.
William Kristol and Robert Kagan help found The Weekly Standard, a magazine that became the main outlet for a muscular, interventionist foreign policy. The same circle of writers and the American Enterprise Institute formed the milieu from which the Project for the New American Century emerged. It gave the movement a steady public voice.
PNAC publishes its founding Statement of Principles, calling for higher defense budgets, a challenge to regimes hostile to American interests, and a foreign policy of strength. Its twenty-five signatories included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, I. Lewis Libby, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Dan Quayle. Many would soon hold senior posts in government.
William Kristol and Robert Kagan establish the Project for the New American Century, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington. It called for American global leadership backed by higher military spending and a willingness to confront hostile regimes. Kristol chaired the group, which stayed small but was closely tied to prominent Republican figures.
PNAC sends an open letter to President Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein from power, arguing that containment was failing and that Iraq's weapons programs were a growing threat. Signatories included Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Richard Perle. The letter set out the regime-change goal the group would press for years.
PNAC writes to House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, pressing Congress to make the removal of Saddam Hussein a stated aim of American policy. It asked the leaders to fund and support opposition to the Iraqi government. The push helped shape the Iraq Liberation Act that Congress passed later that year.
PNAC releases a report titled Rebuilding America's Defenses, laying out a plan for sustained high military spending, forward bases, and modernized forces to keep American dominance. It argued for a larger military budget and a global posture built around preventing rivals from rising. The report drew on ideas the group's members had promoted since the early 1990s.
Rebuilding America's Defenses states that the process of military transformation "is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event, like a new Pearl Harbor." In context the line describes how hard reform is to drive without a galvanizing shock. Whether PNAC wanted or foresaw such an event is disputed and unproven. What the record does show is that after September 11 the group moved within days to use the attacks to press the regime-change agenda it had urged since 1998. The 9/11 Truth movement reads the line as proof of foreknowledge; most historians read it as an observation, not a call for one.
Richard Perle, a PNAC signatory, becomes chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory panel to the Secretary of Defense. From that seat he was an outspoken advocate for confronting Iraq. He held the chair until 2003, when he stepped down amid questions over conflicts of interest.
Several PNAC signatories join the new administration: I. Lewis Libby as chief of staff to Vice President Cheney, Richard Armitage as Deputy Secretary of State, John Bolton as Under Secretary of State for arms control, and Zalmay Khalilzad in senior White House and diplomatic roles. Their placements spread the group's members across the departments that shaped foreign policy. These were documented federal appointments.
Donald Rumsfeld becomes Secretary of Defense and Paul Wolfowitz his deputy, both signatories of PNAC documents. They took charge of military policy and would help drive the planning for the invasion of Iraq. Their appointments put PNAC's leading defense thinkers at the top of the Pentagon.
Dick Cheney, a signatory of PNAC's 1997 Statement of Principles, is sworn in as Vice President under George W. Bush. He became one of the most powerful voices in the administration on national security and Iraq. His office would be central to the case for war.
Nine days after the September 11 attacks, PNAC sends President Bush an open letter urging a wide response, including the removal of Saddam Hussein even if no evidence tied Iraq to the attacks. It also called for action against groups and states the group saw as hostile. The letter renewed the regime-change goal PNAC had pressed since 1998.
In his State of the Union address, President Bush groups Iraq with Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil" that threatened world peace. The speech marked a public turn toward confronting Iraq. It echoed the regime-change aim PNAC had urged since 1998.
In a commencement speech at West Point, President Bush lays out a policy of striking threats before they fully form, rather than waiting to be attacked. The idea became known as the Bush Doctrine of preemption. It matched the forward, assertive posture PNAC had long argued for.
The Bush administration publishes its National Security Strategy, which puts preemptive action against emerging threats at the center of American policy. It also stated a goal of keeping the United States militarily unmatched. The document turned themes PNAC had promoted into official government strategy.
A United States-led coalition invades Iraq and topples Saddam Hussein, carrying out the regime change PNAC had publicly urged since 1998. The group had openly advocated this policy for years, and many of its signatories now held the posts that planned and ran the war. Critics call it PNAC's war and argue the group drove it; others note the decision had many causes, and that documented overlap of personnel and policy is not the same as sole causation.
The Iraq Survey Group, led by Charles Duelfer, reports that Iraq had no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction at the time of the invasion. The finding undercut the main public justification for the war. It sharpened the debate over how the case for war had been built and who had pushed it.
Francis Fukuyama, a signatory of PNAC's founding statement, publicly breaks with the movement in his book America at the Crossroads. He argued that the Iraq War showed the limits of trying to remake other countries by force. His split marked a wider fracture among the group's former allies.
By 2006 the Project for the New American Century had wound down, with its office effectively closed and little new output. The Iraq War had turned costly and unpopular, and the group's moment had passed. It left behind a record of documents, signatories, and policies rather than an ongoing organization.
William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Dan Senor found the Foreign Policy Initiative, widely seen as the successor to PNAC. It carried forward the same case for an assertive American foreign policy and strong defense spending. The new group kept the network active after PNAC itself had closed.
Looking back, historians and journalists debate how much PNAC shaped the Iraq War and the wider turn to preemption. Most agree the group helped set the agenda and that its members held the posts that made policy, while cautioning that a costly, disputed war had many drivers beyond one think tank. The record of its documents, signatories, and appointments is documented; the weight of its influence remains argued.
The Foreign Policy Initiative closes after eight years, ending the direct institutional line that ran back to PNAC. Its shutdown came as the Republican Party moved away from the interventionist consensus the network had championed. The closure marked the end of the organized project.